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PEOPLE V. W EIN
[50 C.2d 383; 326 P.2d 457]

[Crim. No. 6130.

In Bank.

383

1\Iay 27, 1958.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. EDWARD SIMON WEIN,
Appellant.
[1] Jury-Challenges-Voir Dire-Questions as to Death Penalty.
-A prosecutor in a case where the death penalty may be imposed has the right to ascertain the views of potential jurors on
capital punishment so that he can intelligently exercise his
challenges against those whose consciences would preclude
them from imposing this penalty. (Pen. Code, § 1074, subd. 8.)
[2] !d.-Challenges-Voir Dire-Hypothetical Questions.-During
the questioning of prospective jurors, a prosecutor may properly use his explanation of the law applicable to the case as a
basis for hypothetical questions to determine whether the
jurors would follow the instructions of the court and to ascertain their state of mind on the issues to be presented.
[3] Criminal Law-Conduct of Counsel-During Voir Dire Examination.-A prosecutor may properly inform prospective jurors
that he represents all the people of the state, not just the
victims or police, where he in effect does little more than state
general theories underlying criminal prosecutions.
[4] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Conduct of CounseL-A defendant
who failed to object to alleged improper conduct of the prosecutor's examination of prospective jurors cannot complain for
the first time on appeal, where on objection any danger that
the jury might have misunderstood their duty could have been
corrected by proper instructions.
[5] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attorney.-While arguments of a prosecutor should be addressed
McK. Dig. References: [1] Jury, § 103(7); [2] Jury, § 102(4);
[3] Criminal Law,§ 589; [4, 19] Criminal Law,§ 1092; [5] Criminal Law,§ 1404; [6, 11] Criminal Law, § 632; [7] Criminal Law,
§ 629; [8] Criminal Law, § 1098; [9, 12] Criminal Law, § 1404(12);
[10] Criminal Law, § 1404(1); [13] Criminal Law, § 1309; [14]
Rape, §§ 90, 92; [15] Kidnaping, §§ 1, 7; [16] Kidnaping, § 2;
[17, 18] Criminal Law, § 453 (6); [20] Criminal Law, § 816; [21]
Criminal Law, § 453 ( 4); [22] Criminal Law,§ 389 (3) ; [23] Criminal
Law,§ 784; [24] Criminal Law,§ 842; [25] Criminal Law,§ 587.1;
[26] Criminal Law,§ 836; [27] Criminal Law,§ 915; [28-31] Kidnaping, §8; [32] Criminal Law, §686; [33, 34] Criminal Law,
§ 1437(7); [35] Criminal Law, § 286; [36, 37] Criminal Law,
§ 277; [38] Criminal Law,§ 1363; [39, 40] Criminal Law,§ 235(4);
[41] Criminal Law, § 211; [42) Criminal Law, § 1475; [43, 44]
Criminal Law, § 107; [45] Criminal Law, § 1218; [46] Criminal
Law, § 1063.
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to the
and the practice of addressing individual
jurors by name during argument should be condemned, such
conduct is not necessarily prejudicial.
[6] Id.- Argument of Counsel- Comments on Punishment.-.A
prosecutor may properly urge his points vigorously as long
as he does not act unfairly, and may therefore vigorously urge
the jury to convict and to impose the death penalty in the light
of the evidence.
[7] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Comment on Defendant.-A prosecutor may use appropriate epithets warranted by the evidence,
such as defendant was among that "strange breed" of "kidnapers, Tobbers and foTcible rapists," without being chargeable with pTejudicialmisconduct.
[8] !d.-Appeal- Objections- Misconduct of Prosecuting Attorney.-\Vhere no objection was made in the trial court to
the conduct of the prosecuting attorney during his argument
to the jury and no instructions were asked, claims of misconduct will be rejected when the point is raised for the first time
on appeal.
[9] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attorney.-Alleged misconduct of the prosecuting attorney was
not a ground for Teversal where any possible harmful effect
could have been obviated by timely admonition to the jury
and where the evidence was not so closely balanced, presenting
grave doubts as to defendant's guilt, that the prosecutor's
argument materially affected the outcome.
[10] !d.-Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-Though the prosecutor in a case involving a series
of kidnapings and sex offenses might have strayed beyond the
bounds of peTmissible argument in stating, "Why, this fellow
puts Caryl Chessman to shame. He makes a Tank amateur out
of Caryl Chessman," and though defendant made timely objection, but the court allowed the prosecutor to continue along
the same lines, such alleged misconduct did not constitute
ground for reversal where it was not claimed on the trial or
on appeal that the peTpetrator of the several offenses should
have had imposed on him any punishment less than that which
the juTy imposed, and where, notwithstanding defendant's sole
claim that he was not the perpetrator, the evidence of his guilt
was so strong that there was no reasonable pTobability that
any result more favorable to him would have been reached in
the absence of the claimed misconduct.
[11] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Comment on Punishment.-Statements of the prosecuting attorney both in his voir dire examination of the jury and his closing argument that a sentence
of life imprisonment without possibility of paTole would not
necessarily mean that defendant would Temain in prison for
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the remainder of his life were not improper where they could
have been taken by the jurors as factors to be considered
the penalty.
[12] Id.-Appeal-Rarmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-In a prosecution involving a series of kidnapings
and sex offenses, the prosecutor's reference in his
to
the Legislature's consideration of a bill proposing a moratorium on the death penalty did not harm defendant where
the prosecutor made it clear that he did not believe any moratorium would be adopted, and where he merely used this to
show how changes in penalties could be sought in amplification
of his remarks on the uncertainties of a sentence to life imprisonment without parole.
[13] !d.-Appeal- Questions of Law and Fact- Authority of
Court.-It is not the function of the Supreme Court as an
appellate court to reweigh the evidence; though there may be
sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of not guilty, this does
not show that a verdict of guilty was without evidentiary support.
[14] Rape-Appeal-Review of Evidence-Improbable Testimony.
-It was within the jury's province in a case involving a series
of sex offenses to reject defendant's statements that as a small
man with an injured back he would have been unable to seize
a woman, tie her and then rape her, and to believe the testimony of the various women he had abused, where they had a
full view of his stature and the relative stature of the victims,
and where there was nothing in the record to establish that
it was physically impossible for defendant to have performed
the acts ascribed to him or to compel the reviewing court to
declare the numerous victims' testimony inherently improbable.
[15] Kidnaping-Elements.-It is the fact, not the distance, of
forcible removal that constitutes kidnaping; testimony of victims fixing the amounts of movement between rooms in a dwelling at distances ranging from a few feet up to more than
50 feet sufficed for a conviction of kidnaping for the purpose
of robbery under Pen. Code, § 209, since such conduct went
beyond mere detention.
[16] !d.-Validity of Statute.-Pen. Code, § 209, relating to kidnaping, is constitutional as against the objection that the language "who kidnaps or carries away" is uncertain; while defendant has a right to fair notice as to what acts are prohibited, the code section contains terms well enough known to
enable him and others to understand their import; it need not
include detailed plans and specifications of the proscribed conduct.
[15] See Cal.Jur.2d, Kidnaping, § 11.
50 C.2d-13
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[17] Criminal Law-Evidence-Declarations and Conduct Respecting Accusations.-In a prosecution involving a series of kidnapings and sex offenses, testimony concerning a remark made
by one of the victims when she met defendant after seeing
him in a jail line-up, "Well, I'm glad they caught you, kid,"
to which he made no reply, was correctly admitted to permit
the jurors to evaluate its accusatory nature and the weight
accorded to defendant's failure to make any reply.
[18] Id.- Evidence- Declarations and Conduct Respecting Accusations.-In a prosecution involving a series of kidnapings
and sex offenses, defendant's statement to a witness who had
seen defendant at the home of one of the victims prior to
the attack and who later asked defendant several questions at
the behest of police officers, that he would not answer any
questions unless he had an attorney present was harmless
where it might have been excluded if objection had been made.
[19] !d.-Appeal- Objections- Conduct of CounseL-Defendant
cannot make his first attack on the arguments of the prosecuting attorney with regard to admissions on appeal when any
error could have been obviated at the trial.
[20] Id.-Instructions-Evidence-Admissions.-The giving of instructions on the definition of an admission, the effect of silence
or a false or evasive reply, and the possibility of falsehoods
indicating consciousness of guilt was not error where evidence
of such admissions and reactions thereto, introduced without
objection, could be considered by the jury.
[21] Id.- Evidence- Declarations and Conduct Respecting Accusation.-In a prosecution involving a series of kidnapings
and sex offenses, testimony that when a victim saw defendant
in a public place and had him detained she said, "This is the
man that raped and kidnaped me," defendant's reply, "That
gal is drunk," could be considered an equivocal answer to a
direct accusation.
[22] !d.-Evidence-Facts Showing Consciousness of Guilt.-In a
prosecution involving a series of kidnapings and sex offenses,
where defendant's testimony placing him at another location
during one of the attacks was directly contradicted by his own
statements to police officers shortly after his arrest, the jury
could have considered the latter statement as a false or contradictory statement showing a consciousness of guilt.
[23] !d.-Instructions-Evidence-Consciousness of Guilt.-In a
prosecution involving a series of kidnapings and sex offenses,
it was not error to give the standard instruction on consciousness of guilt and falsehood where, though defendant's witnesses testified he had spent the date of the last attack at his
[17] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 400 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ 559 et seq.
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sister's home, he had been positively identified by the victim
in her testimony as the person who committed the offenses in
her home on that date, and where he told the police following
his arrest that he had on that date been at specified places
other than his sister's home, since the jury could properly
infer from this evidence that defendant had procured false and
fabricated alibi evidence with respect to the date in question.
[24] !d.-Instructions-Failure to Produce Evidence.-In a prosecution involving a series of kidnapings and sex offenses, it was
not error to give the standard instruction that neither prosecution nor defense is required to produce all available evidence,
though defendant pointed out that the brothers and sisters of
a 14-year-old victim who were in the house when defendant
arrived but were not present when the criminal acts were
perpetrated, and the escort of the last victim who was with
her when she encountered defendant in a public place and
had him apprehended, were not called to testify, where the
witnesses could not have testified to any ultimate issues or
essential elements of the crimes.
[25] !d.-Conduct of Counsel-Duty to Call Witnesses.-There is
no compulsion on the prosecution to call any particular witness
so long as there is fairly presented to the court the material
evidence bearing on the charge for which defendant is on trial.
[26] Id.-Instructions-Witnesses-Impeachment-Contradictory
Statements.-In a prosecution involving a series of kidnapings
and sex offenses, it was proper to refuse defendant's general
instruction pertaining to all witnesses and to give the standard
instruction on contradictory statements with its clause applicable when defendant is a witness, since the standard instruction covers contradictions by all witnesses and docs not place
too great emphasis on defendant's own statements.
(27] Id. - Instructions - Punishment.-Alleged uncertainty between two paragraphs of an instruction because the second
did not repeat the number of the counts of the information
in discussing them the second time could not have created any
confusion in the minds of the jurors as to what they could
consider in fixing penalties, where the character of the offenses
discussed in the second paragraph was clearly mentioned and
the various counts have been fully explained in a preceding instruction.
[28] Kidnaping-Instructions-Punishment.-The jury could not
have been confused by that portion of one instruction telling
them not to consider the possible penalties on counts other
than kidnaping for the purpose of robbery with bodily harm
and the portion of another instruction telling them, "it is your
duty to conscientiously consider all the evidence in the case
in arriving at your decision as to the penalty to be fixed by
you in this case," where this quotation was part of an instruc-
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""''"""tlv placed in the jury's absolute discretion the

of
the death penalty or confinement for life
possibility of parole (Pen. Code, § 209) for kidnaping
for the purpose of robbery with bodily harm and permitted
the jury to take all the evidence into consideration on this
alone.
[29] !d.-Province of Jury-Determination of Penalty.-The
has the right to use all of the evidence in choosing between
the two penalties authorized for kidnaping for the purpose of
robbery where bodily harm has been suffered by the victim,
and is not required to set the penalty by referring only to the
evidence introduced on the particular count. (Pen. Code,
§ 209.)
[30] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-That portion of an instruction that "Insofar as selecting the penalty [under Pen. Code,
§ 209] is concerned the law does not itself prescribe, nor
authorize the court to innovate any rule circumscribing the
exercise of your discretion, but, rather commits the whole
matter of its exercise to your judgment and conscience" was
neither meaningless nor incorrect, but was merely another way
of telling the jurors that they were charged with the final determination of the penalty and that they were to act within
their own uncircumscribcd discretion.
[31] !d.-Instructions- Punishment.-With reference to counts
charging kidnaping for the purpose of robbery, the court was
correct in telling the jury that they could consider the evidence
and possible consequences of the two penalties in determining
the punishment defendant should receive. (Pen. Code, § 209.)
[32] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Cautionary Instructions.-If a cautionary instruction is not requested in
prosecutions involving sex offenses that such accusations are
easily made and difficult to disprove and that the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses should be carefully examined, it is
incumbent on the court to give one on its own motion.
[33] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Failure to Give Cautionary
Instructions.-Failure to give a cautionary instruction in a
prosecution involving sex offenses was not prejudicial error
where seven of the eight prosecuting witnesses testified with a
high degree of certainty as to defendant's identification and
criminal acts, where their testimony revealed a set pattern in
which their assailant operated and to this extent their stories
were mutually corroborative, where their narrations were completely consistent in all important respects, and where the only
possible discrepancies that defendant was able to show was
where a 14-year-old victim was uncertain of defendant's height.
[34] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Failure to Give Cautionary
Instructions.-Where it was improbable that the jury would
have rejected the testimony of the prosecuting witnesses if a
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cautionary instruction on sex offenses had
failure
to give the instruction did not result in a
justice
requiring reversal.
[35] Id.-Order of Proof-Evidence in Chief on RebuttaL-The
practice of allowing the district attorney or his aides to withhold a part of their case in chief and to offer it after the
defense has closed is ordinarily condemned, but testimony
introduced
for purposes of
of defendant in his denial on cross-examination of an incident not
charged in the information may be admitted, at least where no
objection is raised.
[36] Id.-Order of Proof-Discretion of Court.-The order of
proof rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court.
(Pen. Code, §§ 1093, subd. 4, 1094.)
[37] Id.-Order of Proof-Discretion of Court.-Where the desirability of admitting testimony at a questioned point in the
trial may be debatable, no abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court should be found when that court did not
have the point brought to its attention.
[38] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Order of Proof-RebuttaLIn a prosecution involving a series of robberies, kidnapings
and sex offenses, expert testimony that defendant's fingerprint
was found on a glass at the home of one of the victims may
have been improperly received on rebuttal where the prosecution had this information two days prior to the close of its case
in chief, but a reversal was not warranted in view of the fact
that, to the extent that defendant might have been unfairly surprised, this was obviated by the granting of his request for
additional time to meet the testimony, and in view of the fact
that the fingerprint merely corroborated the direct testimony
of one of the victims.
[39] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Jury.-The
proper time for the examination of prospective jurors on the
issue of insanity is during their selection at the beginning
of the trial.
[40] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Jury.-The
same jury that passes on the issue of guilt can approach the
insanity issue objectively, since it must be assumed that a fair
and impartial jury would obey instructions and therefore hold
in reserve their ultimate finding on the issue of defendant's
sanity until that separate issue and the evidence supporting it
is, in the prescribed order of the trial, committed to it for determination; the same reasoning refutes any supposition that
the jury could only believe that defendant admits guilt by
offering the plea of insanity.
[41] !d.-Plea-Withdrawal of Plea of Insanity.-The withdrawal
of a plea of insanity was not "forced" on defendant but was a
"free and voluntary" choice made by him with full advice of
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counsel where he was present in chambers when his attorney,
the prosecutor and the trial judge discussed the possible prejudicial effect of questioning prospective jurors on their attitudes toward pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity, where in
response to questions posed by his own counsel he expressed his
desire to withdraw his insanity plea and stated that he understood what had transpired, and where he was also informed
that he could not reinstate the plea as a matter of right during
the course of the trial.
[42] !d.-Double Punishment.-Punishing defendant separately
for violations of Pen. Code, § 209, relating to kidnaping, and
for robberies and sex crimes which were essential parts of the
kidnapings would amount to double punishment forbidden by
Pen. Code, § 654, but would not be ground for reversal where
defendant was subjected to validly imposed death sentences.
[43] !d.-Rights of Accused-Aid of CounseL-The fact that defendant's attorney stated that his client aeknowledged that
the acts charged were perpetrated and only contended that
defendant did not commit them did not indicate lack of competence on the part of defendant's counsel.
[44] !d.-Right of Accused-Aid of CounseL-The handling of the
defense by counsel of the accused's own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare cases where his counsel
displays such a lack of diligence as to reduce the trial to a
farce or a sham; mistakes in judgment by following the strategy employed do not constitute a denial of due process.
[45] !d.-Appeal- Record- Augmentation.-Defendant's motion
in the Supreme Court to augment the record pursuant to Rules
on Appeal, rule 12 (a), by including a certified copy of the
minutes of the municipal court before which the preliminary
examination was conducted should be denied, though that
record was offered to show that defendant was not taken before the municipal court until nearly five days after his
arrest, since rule 12(a) specifically provides for augmentation
only where the record was "offered at or used on the trial or
hearing below and [was] on file in or lodged with the superior
court," where defendant made no showing that the minutes
were ever used in the superior court or that they ever became
a part of that court's records.
[ 46] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Arraignment.
Defendant cannot
claim for the first time on appeal that he was not seasonably
brought before a magistrate.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b) ) from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial.
LeRoy Dawson, Judge. Affirmed; motion to augment record,
denied.
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Prosecution for robbery, rape, sex perversion, kidnaping
and kidnaping for purpose of robbery. Judgments of conviction of kidnaping for purpose of robbery imposing death penalty, and judgments of conviction of other offenses imposing
imprisonment for terms prescribed by law, affirmed.
Russell E. Parsons and Henry E. Kappler for Appellant.
Louis I.Jicht as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Elizabeth Miller,
Ray R. Goldie and Joe Yasaki, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Respondent.
SPENCE J.-Defendant was charged by information with
three counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), six counts of rape
(Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3), six counts of sex perversion (Pen.
Code, § 288a), two counts of kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 207),
and five counts of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (Pen.
Code, § 209). Defendant initially entered pleas of not guilty
and not guilty by reason of insanity, but he withdrew the
latter plea prior to trial. The jury found defendant guilty
on all the counts charged in the information. They further
found that in each count charging kidnaping for the purpose
of robbery, the person named therein suffered bodily harm,
and they fixed the penalty at death; and that in each count
charging robbery, the crime was in the first degree. A motion
for a new trial was denied. Defendant was sentenced to death
on the five counts of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery
done with bodily harm, and to the state prison for the term
prescribed by law on each of the remaining counts, the last
mentioned sentences to run consecutively. This appeal from
the judgments of death comes before us automatically. (Pen.
Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) Defendant's present counsel have
been substituted for his trial counsel for the purpose of this
appeal.
These convictions arose out of separate attacks on eight
different women, which attacks occurred over a period of approximately 18 months. It would serve no useful purpose to
relate all the sordid facts surrounding the commission of the
several offenses. The evidence concerning the last incident
will be set forth in some detail, as it typifies the general pattern
which ran through most of the attacks with but slight variations.
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On October
1956, the last victim advertised some furniture for sale in several newspapers circulated in the Los
Angeles vicinity, giving her telephone number but not her
address. She occupied a lower apartment in a house located
in the Hollywood hills. At about noon on October 31, 1956,
she received a telephone call from a man in response to the
and she made an appointment for him to see
the furniture that afternoon. The man arrived at about 2 :30
p. m. and identified himself as the party who had called earlier
that day. A friend of the victim was present at her apartment when he arrived. He indicated that he was interested
in beds and accompanied the victim into the bedroom to
examine them. After seeing and discussing the furniture for
10 to 15 minutes, the man
saying that he would either
call or return after visiting another place. The victim drove
her friend home at about 3 :30 p. m. and returned to her apartment at about 3 :45 p. m.
About five minutes after her return, the man reappeared
at the apartment and said that he wanted to measure one
of the beds to see if it would fit his living quarters. After
measuring the bed, he stated that he would like to call his
wife and have her view the furniture. With the victim's permission, he used her telephone, and after dialing a number
and apparently getting no response, he hung up.
The man then looked at his watch and told the victim that
he had lost his watch stem. She sympathized with him and
got down on the floor in the small hall just out<>ide the living
room to help him look for it. Being unable to find the r:;tem,
she started to get up. The man, who was then behind her, put
his arm around her waist and told her to say nothing. She felt
something sharp in her back and discovered that it was a
knife. He instructed her to lie down and then tied her hands
with copper wire.
He then told the victim to find her billfold, and after helping her up, told her that he wanted only money and that he
would not hurt her. She could not remember exactly where
she had last placed her billfold. With his arms around her
and the knife in her back, he forced her against her will and
without consent to walk with him to a desk in the living room.
This ;vas a distance of approximately 20 to 25 feet. He opened
the desk drawer but the billfold was not there. He told the
victim to crawl on her kneeR through the living room to the
bedroom, a distance of about 50 feet, and she complied out
of fear. She told him to look in the dresser drawers. He found
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it and the $17 or $18 it contained in
The man then
the victim to the floor and said, "Now
I have got the money, hmv about some sex?" He then removed
the clothing from the lower
of her
, exposed his
and forced her to engage in an act of oral
§
while he brandished a knife.
Thereafter,
he
in an act
of sexual intercourse.
The telephone then rang and the occupants of the upstairs
apartment started to walk around. The man said that he
was going to leave. He made the victim lie on the floor on
her stomach, tied her
with her
and shoved her undergarments into her mouth. He then picked np a towel and
ripped it, using the larger portion to wipe the floor, drawers
and door knobs. He tied the other part of the towel around
her mouth and covered her head with another towel. After
he had left, she struggled and was able to free her hands and
feet. She then summoned the police.
'l'he seven other incidents reflect in varying degrees the
same techniques and show a consistent pattern of operations
used by the perpetrator of these crimes. In each case, either
rentals of living quarters or sales of personal property had
been advertised in the ne>vs:papers. In all but one, he gained
entrance on the pretext that he was answering the advertisement. He would often usc some ruse to survey the premises
for other occ:upants, sueh as asking to wash his hands in the
bathroom, viewing the items for sale, or making a telephone
call. In several instances, he left after finding some impediment to his scheme, later returning at a more opportune time.
In some, he pretended to call his wife or girl friend to have
her join in the selection. He feigned that he had dropped a
watch stem in six cases and a watch crystal in another. He
grabbed the victims from behind and threatened them with
a knife. 'I'heir hands were tied with copper wire in several
cases, and their
were bound with their own stockings. In
many ways, the methods that he employed in forcing the
victims to part with their money and, in most instances, to
submit to his lustful desires were strikingly similar. Of
course, all the similarities did not appear in every case. The
sexual molestations varied in degree and did not occur at all
in one case. During one attack, the assailant and another man
were present. Neve1·theless, there can be little doubt that the
same man committed all of the numerous crimes charged.
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Defendant was connected with these offenses in several
ways. Seven of the victims positively identified him as their
assailant. The eighth said he looked like the same man. Beyond these identifications, there were four other phases of the
evidence corroborating the victims. First, a man transacting
business with one of the victims clearly identified defendant
as the person who was with her the night before she was
molested. Second, a ear which defendant had borrowed from
a friend was seen parked in the driveway of the residence
of one of the victims by hvo witnesses who recognized the
vehicle by the lettered part of the California license plate and
the somevvhat unique brand of tires on it. Third, defendant
was identified as the man who answered an advertisement for
the sale of a used kitchen range and who left a check in payment. A handwriting expert testified that defendant was the
person who wrote the check. There was no attack involved
in the last mentioned incident. Fourth, expert witnesses
testified that a fragmentary fingerprint found on a water
glass, used by the assailant at the home of one of the victims,
was the fingerprint of defendant.
Defendant denied that he had committed any of the offenses.
Witnesses were called to testify to his good reputation. He
also presented testimony indicating that he was at other locations during the time that three of the offenses had been
committed.

Conduct of Prosecuting Attorney During
Voir Dire Examination

[1] Defendant contends that the deputy district attorney
was overly zealous in questioning the prospective jurors. He
primarily objects to the examination of the jurors about their
opinions on capital punishment and to the discussion of their
responsibility for imposing the death penalty if warranted
by the facts of the ease. However, a prosecutor in a case where
the death penalty may be imposed clearly has the right to
ascertain the views of the potential jurors (see People v. Hoyt,
20 Cal.2d 306, 318 [125 P.2d 29]; People v. Rollins, 179 Cal.
793, 795-796 [ 179 P. 209] ) so that he can intelligently exercise his challenges against those whose consciences would preclude them from imposing this penalty. (See Pen. Code,
§ 1074, subd. 8; People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 573-576 [305
P.2d1].)
[2] Defendant also deems portions of the prosecutor's explanation of the law applicable to the case to have been preju-
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dicial. However, the prosecutor properly used such explanation as a basis for hypothetical questions to determine whether
the jurors would follow the instructions of the court (Kramm
Stockton Electric R.R. Co., 22 Cal.App. 737, 746-747 [136
P. 523]) and to ascertain their state of mind on the issues
to be presented. (People v. Knight, 44 Cai.App.2d 887, 891893 [113 P.2d 226] .)
[3] Defendant challenges the prosecutor's
to the
effect that he represented all of the people of this state and
not just the victims or police, as being calculated to impress
the jurors with the importance of his position and to cause
them to give undue weight to his actions. However, it was
entirely proper for this public officer to inform the panel of
his functions. In effect, he did little more than to state general theories underlying criminal prosecutions. [4] In any
event, since defendant failed to object to any of the alleged
improper conduct during the deputy district attorney's examination of the veniremen, he cannot now complain for the first
time as, upon objection, any danger that the jury might have
misunderstood their duty could have been corrected by proper
instructions. (People v. Brice, 49 Cal.2d 434, 437 [317 P.2d
961] ; People v. Guasti, 110 Cal.App.2d 456, 465 [243 P.2d
591.)

Conduct of Prosecuting Attorney During Arguments
Defendant raises numerous objections to the deputy district
attorney's arguments to the jury and states that the alleged
misconduct denied him a fair trial as guaranteed by both the
state and federal Constitutions. He claims that the jurors
were "whipped" into their recommendation of the death
penalty. This, in his view, was apparently produced by the
prosecutor calling the jurors by their names, by taking them
to task, and by using epithets. However, his conclusions entirely overstate the actual situation. It is true (1) that the
deputy distriet attorney did refer to one or more jurors by
name on three Reparate occasions; (2) that he did vigorously
urge the jury throughout his arguments to impose the death
penalty; and ( 3) that he did use ''epithets'' when he referred to defendant as being among that "strange breed" of
"kidnapers, robbers and forcible rapists." [5] \Vith respect
to the first point, while arguments should be addressed to
the jury as a body and the praetice of addressing individual
jurors by name during the argument should be condemned
rather than approved, it does not follow that sueh eonduet
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[6] With reis entitled to a
fair trial, the prosecutor may properly urge his
vigorously as long as he does not act
; and therefore
he may vigorously urge the
to convict and to impose
the death
in the
of the evidence. (People v.
732P.2d
.) [7] And with
219 Cal.
ro·~n''"t to the third
the prosecutor may use
epithets which are warranted
the evidence without being
chargeable with prejudicial misconduct.
v. Carr, 113
Cal.App.2d 783, 788 [248 P.2d
v.
49
Cal.App.2d 243, 250-251 [121 P.2d
v. Bnrnette,
39 Cal.App.2d 215, 230
P.2d 799].) [8] In any event,
no objection was made in the trial court to any of the above
conduct or to certain other matters of which defendant now
complains, and no instructions were asked with respect thereto. We have consistently rejected snch claims when the point
is raised for the first time on appeal.
v. Ham.pton, 47
Cal.2d 239, 240-241 [302 P.2d 300] ;
v. Byrd, 42 Cal.
2d 200, 208 [266 P.2d 505] .) [9] Furthermore, this is not
a case where any possible harmful effect of the comments
could not have been obviated by a timely admonition to the
jury (see People v. J{irkes, 39 Cal.2d 719, 726-727 [249 P.2d
1]) or where the evidence was so closely balanced, presenting
grave doubt as to defendant's guilt, that the prosecutor's
argument materially affected the outcome. (People v. Fleming, 166 Cal. 357, 381 [136 P. 291, Ann. Cas. 1915B 881] .)
[10] There was one instance during the prosecutor's argument, however, where he may have strayed beyond the bounds
of permissible argument and where a prompt objection was
made by defendant's counsel. The prosecutor said, in part,
"Why, this fellow puts Caryl Chessman to shame. He makes
a rank amateur out of Caryl Chessman." At this point, the
defense counsel cited this as prejudicial misconduct and requested that the jury be instructed to disregard it. The
prosecutor then asserted his right under People v. ]{ynette, 15
Cal.2d 731 [104 P.2d 794], to proceed along these lines and
the court permitted him to do so. He then contrasted Chessman's attacks from an automobile disguised as a police vehicle
operating in the relative open of the public streets with defendant's assaults in the victims' homes. He then said,
''Chessman, too, had ice water in his veins. That little girl
[the 14-year-old victim in this
. . . will carry a mark
on her forever. She may end up the same way Mary Alice
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the victim of the Chessman
institution unless she has a strong mind
and can in some way
her
thinking beat it."
He then concluded that the death
was deserved because the defendant
the ".
behavior pattern of
a cold cruel individual with ice water in his veins.''
The
attempt to
the
as did
the prosecutor at the
v. Kynette,
supra. There it was said: ''Counsel may illuminate his argument
illustrations which may be as various as the resources
of his talents. He may refer to matters of common knowledge,
not special to the case, and to well known historical incidents.''
Cal.2d 731, 757.) It appears, however, that the comments
here were more similar to those criticized in People v. Jackson,
44 Cal.2d 511 [282 P.2d 898]. There the prosecutor in a kidnaping case referred to the Greenlease, Hart, and Lindbergh
cases, and compared the ultimate fate of the victims. ( 44
Cal.2d 511, 520.) But even assuming that the prosecutor here
went beyond the bounds of legitimate argument in his comparison of this case with the Chessman case, it does not follow
that a reversal is required. It was not claimed on the trial or
on this appeal that the perpetrator of the several offenses
should have had imposed upon him any punishment less than
that which the jury imposed. Defendant's sole claim was that
he was not the perpetrator. vVe have reviewed the record, and
such review convinces us that the evidence of defendant's
guilt was so strong that there is no reasonable probability that
any result more favorable to defendant would have been
reached in the absence of the claimed misconduct. Under such
circumstances, the claimed misconduct does not constitute
ground for a reversal. (People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818,
837-838 [299 P.2d 243].)

Argunwnt of Prosecuting Attorney as to Meaning of Life
Imprisonment without Possibility of Parole and Legislative Abolition of Death Penalty
[11] Defendant asserts that it was prejudicial error for
the deputy district attorney to have stated both in his voir
dire examination of the jury and his closing argument that a
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole
would not
mean that defendant would remain in
prison for the remainder of his life. He pointed out that any
such sentence could be commuted by the Governor, that a
pardon could be granted by the Governor, or that the Legisla-
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enaet a law
the sentence. In People v.
38 Cal.2d 166, 189-190
P.2d 1001 , the identical remarks, both in the argument by the prosecutor and the
explanatory instruetions by the eourt, were sanetioned insofar
as they were addressed to the dis<:retion of the jury in speeifythe punishment for kidnailing for the purpose of robbery
where the victim suffered bodil.r harm. (See also
47 Cal.2d 112, 116-117 [301 P.2d
43 Cal.2d 572, 580-581 [275 P.2d 25] ;
v. Byrd,
S1lpm, 42 Cal.2d 200, 206-208.)
When the dE'puty district attorney's remarks are reatl in full, it is quite apparent that they
eould only haYe been taken by the jurors as faetors to be considered in assessing the penalty. 'l'he ease of People v. Morlock, 46 Cal.2d 141, 147-148 [292 P.2d 897], relied upon by
defendant, is clearly distinguishable. There, the prosecutor
erroneously stated that a person sentenced to life imprisonment was eligible for parole within seven years rather than
after having sened seven years. E(pmlly unavailing is People
v. Cartmw, 29 Cal.2rl 616, 619-620 [177 P.2d 11, sinee the only
comments there held improper were to the effect that paroles
might be granted without regard to merit in order to provide
space for incoming prisoner;;;.
[12] Defendant also maintains that the deputy district attorney's reference to the Ijegislature 's consideration of a bill
proposing a moratorium on the death penalty may have
harmed him by leading the jurors to believe that he would
benefit from sueh a suspension. Hovvever, the deputy district
attorney made it abundantly clear that he did not believe
that any sueh moratorium would be adopted. He merely used
this to show how ehanges in penalties could be sought in
amplication of his remarks on the uncertainties of a sentence
to life imprisonment without parole.
Sufficiency
Evidence
Defendant argues that there was ample evidenee to
have supported a verdiet of acquittal, and he buttresses this
eonelusion by marshali11g those facts whirh tend to show his
innoeenee. lie tben eharac:terizcs parts of the People's expert testimony as "highly suspect." From this, he expresses
the hE'lief that the jury might well have accepted his alibi except for the "grossly prejudieial" eon duct of the prosecutor.
Insofar as this again raises the question of prejudice from the
proseentor 's actions, this has been fully considered. Insofar
as it c-hallenges the suffieieney of the evidence, defendant is
merely asking us to reweigh the evidenee. This is dearly not
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our fuuction as an appellate court. (See People v. Daugherty,
40 Cal.2d 876, 885 [256 P.2d 911]; People v. Headlee, 18 Cal.
2d 266, 267 [115 P.2d 427]; People v.
15 Cal.2d 678,
681 [104 P.2d 778] ; People v. Tedesco, 1 Cal.2d 211, 219 [34
P.2d 467] .) Further, even though there might have been
sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of not guilty, this in
no way shows that the verdict of guilty was without abundant
support.
[14] F'inally, defendant attempts to show that some of the
rvic1ence was so highly improbable as to be incredible and to
thus allow an appellate court to set aside the eonviction. (See
v. Headlee, supr·a, 18 Cal.2d 266.) He says that, as a
small man with an injured back, he would have been unable
to seize a woman, tie her, and then rape her. The jury only
had defendant's own testimony as to the eondition of his
but they did have a full view of his stature and the relative stature of the vidims. Tt was within their province torehis statements, as they apparently chose to do. 'I'hey
evidently believed the testimony of the various women vvhom
he had abused. 'l'he conflict in the evidenee was resolved by
the triers of fact. There is nothing in the reeord to establish
that it was physically impossible for defendant to have performed the acts aseribed to him, or to compel us to declare that
the numerous victims' testimony was inherently improbable.
(People v. Huston. 21 Cal.2d 6!l0. 608 [134 P.2d 7581; People
v. Wilder, 151 Cal.App.2d 698, 704-705 [312 P.2d 425] .)
E:rfent of Movement Req11ircd to Establish Kidnaping
Under Penal Code, Election 209

[15] Defendant urges that the Legislature in enaeting
seetion 209 of the Penal Code, whieh permits the imposition
of the death penalty against ''any person . . . who kidnaps
or carries away any individual to commit robbery" if the
vietim suffers bodily harm, intended that the movement be
over a substantial distanee and not merely between the rooms
in a dwelling. He expressly asks this court to reconsider the
position it took in People v. Chessman, supra, 38 Cal.2d 166,
190-193. There we said, "The fact that Regina in being
kidnaped or carried away was forced to move only 22 feet
does not make her abdmtion any the less kidnaping within
the meaning of the statute. She was taken from the car of
her ehosen escort, and from hiR company, to the car of defendant and into the latter's company and there detained as a
virtual prisoner and forced to submit to his demands. It is the
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fact, not the
of forcible removal whieh constitutes
kidnaping in this state."
Cal.2d 166, 192.) We there
reviewed the California cases and those from other jurisdictions where kidnapings were held to exist although the asportations were not great.
the
of some of the
victims fixed the amounts of movement at distances ranging
from a few feet up to more than 50 feet. Under the reasoning
and language of the Chessman
any oE these distances
sufficed for a conviction under
ehallenged section. This
conduct went beyond a mere detention during the eourse of
an armed robbery, which is no longer punishable by death.
(See People v.
135 Cal.App.2d 201 [286 P.2d 952].)
To the extent that defendant's argument is predieated on legislative intent, it must be noted that the
has been
in session several times since the Chessman case \Vas decided,
and it has not seen fit to amend the kidnaping law to limit the
rule we announced. If the seetiou, as interpreted by this court,
is regarded as too harsh, the remedy is for the Legislature to
redefine kidnaping, and not for this court to engraft some
uncertain distance limitation onto the plain language of the
seetion. (See People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175, 180-183 [217
P.2d 1] .)

Constit1dionality of Penal Code, Section 209

[16] Defendant asks that we deelare section 209 unconstitutional because the language, ''who kidnaps or carries away,''
is uncertain. This indefiniteness is supposed to be apparent
from the decisions of this and other California courts. However, defendant fails to cite the decisions which he believes
produce this effect. Rather, it would seem that the previously
quoted language from the Chessman case clearly indicates the
broad sweep of this section.
"While defendant concededly had a right to fair notice as
to what acts were prohibited
In re Peppers, 189 CaL 682
[209 P. 896]; People v. Neff, 117 Cal.App.2d 772, 780-781
[257 P.2d 47] ), it appears that the questioned statute contained terms well enough kno>vn to enable defendant and
others to understand their import. (See Lorenson v. Snperior
Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 59-61 [216 P.2d 859]; People v. Deibert,
117 Cal.App.2d 410, 417-420
P.2d 355]; People v. Darby,
114 Cal.App.2d 412, 427-428
P.2d 743] .) The statute
did not have to include "detailed plans and specifieations"
of the proscribed conduct. (Lorenson v. Superior Court,
S1lpra, 35 Cal.2d 49, 60.)
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erred in adreactions to
admissions. One of the vietims testified that

curred when a
one of the victims
to an
several
at the behest of the
cers. Defendant cast his eyes toward the floor and saw that
he would not answer any
unless he had an attorney
Defendant contends that these ineidents could not
be construed as any type ol'
and that the
error in admitting them \Yas
the deputy
district attorney's comments and the court's instructions.
\Vhile the testimony
the first ineident involving
the remarks of a victim was
admitted in order to
the jurors to evaluate
nature and the
\Veig·ht to be aceorded to defendant's failure to make any reply
People v. Smith, 111 Cal.App.
580-581
P.
),
the second one, where defendant remained silent on the asserted ground that he would not
unless he had an attorney present, might well have been exc·luded if objeetion had
been made. (See People v. Abbott, 47 Ca1.2d
373 [303
P.2d 730] ; People v. McGee, 31 Cal.2d
288-240
P.2d
706].) Howewr, defendant's
to this line of testimony is made for the first time on this appeaL Such belated
attempts to obtain reversals have been held ineffective in
regard to testimony relating to
admissions
v.
Guarino, 132 Ca1.App.2d 554, 559 [282 P.2d
; People v.
Cummings, 7 Cal.App.2d 406, 407 [46 P.2d 778]) and in
regard to admitting hearsay evidenee (People v. Wade, 138
Cal.App.2d 5:31, 53:3 [292 P.2d 303]; Prople v. Jlfnrray, 135
Cal.App.2d 600, 602
P .2d
) . 'I' he rule should apply
with equal forre to testimony relating to alleged adoptive
admissions. [19] Also, defendant cannot
as he attempts here, his first attaek on the arguments of the deputy
district attorney witb regard to admissions on appeal, when
any error could have be0n obviated at the trial. ( S0e People
v. Brice, supra, 49 Cal.2d 434, 4:37; People v. Hampton,
supra, 47 Cal.2d 239, 240-241 [302 P.2d 300].) [20] More-
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over, the giving of instructions on the definition of an admission, the effect of silence or a false or evasive reply, and the
possibility of falsehoods indicating consciousness of guilt (see
Cal. Jury Instrns., Crim. (1946 and Supp. 1953) Nos. 29,
29-D, 30, 30-A) was not error since the evidence introduced
without objection could be considered by the jury. (See
People v. W acle, S7tpm, 138 Cal.App.2d 531, 533; People v.
Murray, supra, 135 Cal.App.2d 600, 603.) [21] Further,
although not raised by the deputy distriet attorney before the
jury, there were other ineidents in the record, admitted without objection, whieh fell within these instructions. When the
last vietim saw defendant in a public place and had him detained, she said, ''This is the Inan that raped and kidnaped
me.'' Defendant made ·what might well be considered an
equivocal answer to the direct accusation when he replied,
"That gal is drunk." [22] Also, defendant's testimony
placing him at another location during one of the attacks was
directly contradicted by his own statements made to the investigating police officers shortly after his arrest. The jury
could have eonsidered the latter statement as a false or eontradictory statement showing consciousness of guilt.

Instructions
Defendant assails certain instructions given to the jury and
challenges the trial court's refusal to utilize some of the
instructions offered by him. [23] First, he complains that
the standard instruction on consciousness of guilt and falsehood (Cal. Jury Instrns., Crim. (1946) No. 30-A) should not
have been read because part of it pertains to situations where
a defendant has "endeavored to procure false or fabricated
evidence to be produced at the trial.'' Defendant's witnesses
testified that he had spent the day of October 31, 1956, being
the date of the last attack, at his sister's home. On the other
hand, defendant had been positively identified by the victim
in her testimony as the person who committed the offenses in
her home on that date. Furthermore, defendant had told the
police following his arrest that he had been at specified places,
other than his sister's home, on the date in question. The jury
could properly infer from this evidence that defendant had,
in fact, procured false and fabricated alibi evidence with
respect to October 31, 1956. There was therefore no error in
giving the challenged instruction.
[24] Second, defendant maintains that while the standard
instruction to the effect that neither the prosecution nor de-
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fense is required to produce all available evidence (CaL ,Jury
Instrns., Crim. (1946) No. 23) correctly stateB the law generally, thiB case comes within a recognized exception. Defendant relies on Peop7e v. Beal, 116 Cal.App.2d 475, 479
[254 P.2d 100], where the court in a case involving the rape
of a 13-year-old girl stated that, since the prosecution failed
to produce the examining physician as a witness, it was to be
"presumed that his testimony ·would not be corroborative of
that given by the complaining witness.'' Here, defendant
points out that the brothers and sisters of the 14-year-old
victim, who were in the house when defendant arrived but
were not present when the eriminal acts were perpetrated,
and the eseort of the last victim, who was with her vYhen she
encountered defendant in a public place and had him apprehended, \Vere not called to testify. However, the Beal case is
readily distinguishable. There, the testimony wonld have
been highly material. The rape vietim was examined by a
physician the morning after the attack but the physician was
not offered as a ·witness. Here, the witnesses could not have
testified to any ultimate issues or essential elements of the
crimes charged. Further, the reversal in the Beal case did
not turn directly on the failure to call the physician. The
court found that certain statements of the prosecuting attorney were highly improper. To show how this misconduct was
prejudicial, the court looked to the even balance of the evidence. It was in this context that it stated the presumption.
(116 Cal.App.2d 475, 477-479.) [25] Instead, People v.
Tuthill, 31 Cal.2d 92, 102 [187 P.2d 16], would seem to be
controlling. There \Ye said, ''There is no compulsion on the
prosecution to call any particular witness . . . so long as
there is fairly presented to the court the material evidence
bearing upon the charge for which the defendant is on trial."
( 31 Cal.2d 92, 98.) This rule applies to the instant ease, and
shows that there was no error in giving the challenged instructions, which substantially reiterated the rule announced
in the Tuthill case.
[26] Third, defendant contends that by using the standard
instruction on contradictory statements with its clause applicable when a defendant is a witness (Cal. Jury Instrns., Crim.
(1946 and Supp. 1953) No. 54-A-alternate), the court unduly
emphasized any contradictions made by defendant. He says
that a general instruction should have been given pertaining
to all witnesses, since one of the victims made conflicting
statements about her assailant's height. However, defendant

0.2d
instruction to be
when
the defendant has not contradicted himself. (CaL Jury
The
difference is in
which correctly
statements ean be
show the truth of such state39 CaL2d
585
instruction covers contradictions
witnesses and does not
too
emphasis on
defendant
statements. The court
refused defendant's own more
since the applicable
law had been
covered.
36 Cal.2d
P.2d 17] ;
30 Ca1.2d 676, 688
234, 240
[185 P.2d 1] .)
[27] Fourth, defendant interposes several objections to instructions on what the jurors could consider in fixing the
penalties. He attempts to show uncertainty between two
paragraphs of one instruction because the second did not repeat the number of the counts of the information in discussing
them the second time. However, this could not have created
any confusion in the minds of the
because the character
of the offenses discussed in the second paragraph was clearly
mentioned and the various counts had been fully explained
in one of the preceding instructions.
[28] Defendant also tries to show a conflict between two
portions of the instructions which he believes could have only
led to
on the part of the jurors. He initially refers to the paragraph
the jury not to consider
the possible
on those counts other than kidnaping
for the purpose of robbery with bodily harm. He then
contrasts a small fragment of another instruction telling the
jurors, ''. . . it is yonr duty to conscientiously consider all
the evidence in the ease in arriving at your decision as to
the penalty to be fixed by you in this case." However, defendant has taken the latter quotation out of the context of
the instruction given by the court on the penalty for kidfor the purpose of robbery where bodily harm has
been suffered
the victim. It correctly and clearly placed
in the
absolute discretion the imposition of either the
death penalty or confinement for life without possibility of
parole
Code, § 209) and permitted the jury to take all
the evidence into consideration on this inquiry alone. These
full instructions could not have confused the jury.
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on the basis of ''. . .
the evidence. . . . ''
also
v.
Al~o, dden(lant claims
the instruction about the

see

nuder section 209 was
the
is concerned
nor authorize the court to
innovate any rule
the exercise of your dis.
hut, rather commits the wlwle matt<'r of: its E'xercise
to your judgm0nt and conseienre." This portion of the instruction was nE'itl1er meaningless nor incorrect.
People
v. Friend, snpra, 47 Cal.2d
767.) It was hut another
way of telling the jurors that they were charged with the
final determination of the penalty, and that they were to act
within their own uncireumscribcd cliseretlon.
[31] Fifth, defendant
to the instruction rovrring
the manner in which the
in its deliberations on those counts
for the purpose of
robbery. He extracts two
says that they were
a misstatement of the law. However, the court was correct
in telling the
that
could consider the evidence and
the possible consequences of the two
in determining
the punishment defendant should receive. (See
Brust, supra, 47 Ca1.2d 776, 789-700, n. 4-;
supra, 47 Cal.2d
767, 768.) The instruction as a whole
presented an accurate summation of the process to be used in
fixing the penalty fol' the Yio1ations of section 209.
Sixth, defendant contends that the iJF;truetions on the
clements necessary to ronstitute a violation of: section 209
were improper.
the i nstrnetions were correctly
based upon the statute and the rules enunciatrd in People
v. Chessman, su~pra, 38 Ca1.2d
192. Also, defendant says
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that there was a mere detention involved here, and that the
instructions on kidnaping under section 209 were inapplicable.
However, there was far more than a mere detention here
as hereinabove indicated.
[32] Seventh, defendant urges that the court erred in
failing to give a cautionary instruction to the effect that, in
prosecutions for sex offenses, accusations are easily made and
difficult to disprove, and that the testimony of the prosecuting
witnesses should be 0arefully examined. Even if such an
instruction is not requested, as here, it is incumbent upon
the court to give one on its own motion. (People v. Nye,
38 Cal.2d 34, 40 [237 P.2d 1]; People v. Willis, 129 Cal.App.
2d 330, 336 [276 P.2d 853] .) [33] However, it is not always
prejudicial error for the court to fail to give the instruction,
since the circumstances of each case are the determinative
factor. (People v. Nye, supra, p. 40; People v. Willis, supra,
p. 337.) Here, seven of the eight prosecuting witnesses
testified with a high degree of certainty as to defendant's
identification and criminal acts. 'fheir testimony revealed a
set pattern in which their assailant operated. To this extent
their stories were mutually corroborative. On the whole, their
narrations were completely consistent in all important repects. The only possible discrepancy that defendant is able
to show was where the 14-year-old victim was uncertain of
defendant's height. Further, other substantial evidence connected defendant with the crimes. [34] As was said in
People v. N ye, supra, page 41: ''A careful examination of
the entire record in accord with artide VI, section 41/z of
the California Constitution, leads us to the conclusion that
it is improbable that the jury would have rejected the testimony of the prosecuting witnesses had a cautionary instruction been given and that there has therefore been no miscarriage of justice requiring reversal of the judgment.''

Admission of Evidence on Rebuttal
Defendant makes two objections to evidence presented by the prosecution on rebuttal. First, he claims that
a woman witness, who was not attacked, should not have
been allowed to testify that defendant answered her newspaper advertisement offering an electric range for sale. She
identified a check as having been given to her by defendant
under an assumed name. Later, a handwriting expert expressed his opinion that the check was written by defendant. This chain of evidence was produced on rebuttal
after defendant had denied on cross-examination all the es-

[35]
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sential facts of the incident. The practice of allowing the
district attorney or his aides to withhold a part of their case
in chief and to offer it after the defense has closed has been
condemned in People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 753-754 [312
P.2d 665], and People v. Rodriquez, 58 Cal.App.2d 415, 418419 [136 P.2d 626]. But here the testimony was clearly
introduced primarily for purposes of impeachment of defendant in his denial on cross~examination of an incident not
charged in the information. In any event, no objection was
made to the introduction of this evidence. [36] Further, the
order of proof rests largely in the souJJd discretion of the
trial court. (Pen. Code, §§ 1093, subd. 4, 1094; People v.
Byt·d, supra, 42 Cal.2d 200, 211-212; People v. Avery, 35
Cal.2d 487, 491 [218 P.2d 527].) [37] Where, as here, the
desirability of admitting- the testimony at the questioned point
may be debatable, no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court should be found when that court has not had the
point brought to its attention. (See People v. Carter, supra,
48 Cal.2d 737, 754.)
[38] Second, defendant claims that the expert testimony
that defendant's fingerprint was found on a glass at the
home of one of the victims should not have been received on
rebuttal. 'l'he prosecution had this information two days
prior to the close of its case in chief. Again we come to the
question whether the district attorney or his aides indulged
in a proscribed withholding of matter properly belonging
in their case in chief. (People v. Carter, supra, 48 Cal.2d
737, 753-754; People v. Rodriqttez, stlpra, 58 Cal.App.2d 415,
418-419.) An affirmative answer seems possible. However,
under the facts of this case, a reversal is not warranted. To
the extent that defendant may have been unfairly surprised,
this was obviated by the granting of his request for additional time to meet this testimony. The fingerprint was probably not unduly magnified in significance, since it merely
corroborated the direct testimony of one of the victims. It
was not as crucial as the defendant's confession withheld
in People v. Rodriq1tez, supra, or the defendant's apparel
found near where the murder weapon was abandoned and
withheld in People v. Carter, supra, a case resting entirely
on circumstantial evidence. In short, it cannot be said that
any claimed error in admitting this testimony on rebuttal
warrants a reversal. (See People v. Byrd, supm, 42 Cal.2d
200, 212; People v. Avery, supra, 35 Cal.2d 487, 491.)
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Trials on Issne

district attorney,
chambers with the trial
the defendant, and
announced his intention to question the
attitudE's toward pleas of not
reason
Defendant claimed the right
to have a separate
the
issue and urged
that defendant -would be
such voir dire examithis was the only time
nation. The
Defendant then withthat the
drew his
of not guilty
r0ason of insanity. Defendant
contends that he was forced to make this eleetion because
the
if so questioned, could only have gained the impression that he was guilty. He sees a denial of due process
and of a fair trial because a defendant is required, in the discretion of the court, to submit the issue of insanity to the
same jury whieh passed on the question of guilt (Pen. Code,
§§ 1016, 1026) and which might not be impartial.
[39] However, it has long been held that the proper time
for the examination of the prospective jurors on the issue of
insanity is during their s0lection at the beginning of the
trial. (People v. Woods, 19 Cal.App.2d 556. 558 [65 P.2d
940]; People v. Foster, 3 Cal.App.2d 35. 39 [39 P.2d 271];
People V, Davis, 94 Cal.App. 192, 197 [270 P. 715].)
[ 40] 'With regard to his assertion that the same jury could
not approaeh the insanity issue objrctively, the following
language employed by this eourt in People v. Leong Fook,
20G CaL G4, 78 [273 P. 779], is significant: "We must
assume that a fair and impartial jury of intelligent men
and women would obey . . . rtheir J instructions and would
therefore hold in reserve their ultimate finding upon the
issue of the defendant's sanity until that separate issue and
the evid0nce supporting it had, in the presrrihed or(1er of
the trial, been committed to it for determination. We are
not to assume that such a jury will eease to be fair and impartial as the cause progresses upon its surcessive issues, but,
on the contrary, we must assume, in the absence of any other
showing, that the jury has retained its attitude of fairness
and impartiality under the changed proe0dure as before until
the whole cause . . . has been determined." This answers defendant's basic
that he would not have received an
impartial trial on the insanity issue. Also, the same reasoning
equally refutes defendant's supposition that the jury could
while
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the plea of
due process
not been advanced before, it is
l1ave
to note that sections 1016 and 1026 of the Penal
been held constitutional despite many similar
v. Da1tgherty, supra, 40 Cal.2d 876,
therein cited.)
cannot say that the withdrawal of the inwas "forced" upon defendant or that he was not
advised of the consequences of his decision. He
present in chambers >v1wn his
the
and the trial
discussed the possible prejudicial effect
the challenged voir dit·e examination. In response to quesposed
his own counsel, he expressed his desire to
withdraw his insanity plea and stated that he understood
what had transpired. He was also informed that he could
not reinstate the plea as a matter of right during the course
of the trial. He might well have been additionally advised
on other matters sueh as the nonbinding effect of the reports
the court-appointed alienists, defendant's right to examine
these experts and to produce his own >vitnesses to controvert
their reports, and the jury's power to make an independent
determination. However, defendant was represented by counsel who initially entered this plea over his client's objections.
Surely, he must have explained to defendant the reasons for
his actions. 'l'hey must have weighed the probabilities of
success on this defense in the light of the unanimous opinions
of the three alienists to the effect that he was sane. Defendant
and his counsel evidently deeided that his cause would be
better served by avoiding what they conceived to be the
harmful effects of the proposed examination of the prospective jurors than by actually pursuing the insanity plea. This
was a "free and voluntary" choice made by defendant with
full advice of counf;cl. (See People v. Mendez, 27 Cal.2d 20,
22 [161 P.2d 929] .)
Donble Punishment
[ 42] Defendnnt asserts that he suffered double punishment
since he was sentenced for the kidnaping for the purpose of
robbery and also for the robbery. Hovvever, it is not necessary
to give extended consideration to this question. As '.Ve said
in People v. Chessman, s11pra, 38 Ca1.2d 166, 193: "Defendant
is correct in his eontention that punishing him separately for
the violations of section 209 of the Penal Code (kidnaping)
and for the robberies and sex erimes which, under the cir-
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cumstances here, are essential parts of those violations, would
amount to double punishment, which is forbidden by section
654 of the Penal Code. [Citing cases.] However, since defendant is subject to two [here five] validly imposed death
sentences, no purpose would be served by reversal of other
judgments of conviction. [Citing cases.] "

Adequacy of Defendant's Representation by Counsel
[43] The only entirely new point raised in the amicus
curiae brief concerns the adequacy of the representation afforded defendant by the attorney whom he selected to conduct
his defense in the trial court. Two aspects of his trial counsel's
actions are specified as showing his lack of competence : His
handling of the voir dire examination and his failure to object
to some of the prosecutor's conduct. His courteous deportment toward the deputy district attorney is said to have prevented him from protecting defendant's rights. In handling
the voir dire examination, he is said to have persistently emphasized that the prosecution's witnesses were all honest and
positive in their identifications, and that the burden of proof
was cast upon defendant to show his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Actually, he primarily stated that his client
acknowledged that the acts were perpetrated and only contended that he did not commit them. His remarks could not
possibly have had the untoward impact upon the jury attributed to them.
[44] But even if we concede that defendant's attorney may
not have used the best of strategy in handling the voir dire
examination and in failing to challenge some of the prosecutor's remarks, defendant still has not made that type of showing which alone would compel us to conclude that he was
deprived of due process within the meaning of the constitutional guarantees. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) The
handling of the defense by counsel of the accused's own choice
will not be declared inadequate except in those rare cases
where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a ''farce or a sham.'' ( Lunce
v. Overlade [7th Cir.], 244 F.2d 108, 110; see also Taylor v.
United States [9th Cir.], 238 F.2d 409, 413-414, cert. denied,
353 U.S. 938 [77 S.Ct. 817, 1 L.Ed.2d 761); United States ex
rel. Feeley v. Ragen [7th Cir.], 166 F.2d 976, 980-981; Hendrickson v. Overlade [N.D. Ind.], 131 F. Supp. 561, 562-564.)
The record in this case does not even remotely approach such
a situation. Defendant's sole defense lay in his claim that his
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identification by the victims was ineorreet. His counsel vigcross-examined the prosecution's witnesses to test their
and assiduously attempted to establish an alibi and
to show defendant's good character. He at most committed
what in retrospect may be claimed to he mistakes in judgment
following certain strategy employed. Such mistakes, if
do not constitute a denial of due process. (United States
rel. Darcy v. IIandy [3d Cir.], 203 F.2d 407, 426, cert.
denied sub nom. Maroney v. United States ex rel. Darcy, 346
U.S. 865 [74 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed. 375] .)

Motion to Augment Record
[45] Defendant moves to augment the record pursuant to
rule 12 (a) of the Rules on .Appeal by incI uding a certified
copy of the minutes of the municipal court before which the
preliminary examination was conducted. That record is
offered to show that defendant was not taken before the municipal court until nearly five days after his arrest. He
claims that there was "unnecessary delay" (Pen. Code, § 849)
and that his constitutional rights were thus violated, citing
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 [77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.
2d 1479]. However, rule 12
on which defendant relies, by
its own terms, provides for augmentation only where the
record was "offered at or used on the trial or hearing below
and [was] on file in or lodged with the superior court."
(Rules on .Appeal, rule 12(a).) Here, defendant makes no
sho·wing that the minutes were ever used in the proceedings
in the superior court or that they ever became a part of that
court's records. (See Estate of Hobart, 82 Cal..App.2d 502,
510 [187 P.2d 105].) [46] Further, it would serve no useful purpose to add the requested document to the record since
defendant cannot claim for the first time on appeal, as he
attempts here, that he was not seasonably brought before a
magistrate. (People v. Newell, 192 Cal. 659, 669 [221 P.
622] ; People v. Tennyson, 127 Cal..App.2d 243, 246 [273 P.2d
593] .) The motion must therefore be denied.
In conclusion, it should be stated that the voluminons record
and briefs have been carefully examined because of the seriousness of the charges made against defendant and because of
the nature of the penalty that has been imposed upon him.
Such examination leads us to the conclusion that the evidence
overwhelmingly showed that he was guilty of the long series
of despicable crimes with which he was charged. We further
conclude that defendant was accorded a fair trial, and that
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there were no errors or other
which would warrant a reversal.
The motion to augment the record is denied. The judgments
and the order denying a new trial are affirmed.
Shenk,
Gibson, C.
McComb,
concurred.

Traynor,

and

CARTER, J.-I dissent on four grounds:
(1) The majority has misconstrued the meaning of the word
"kidnaps" as it is used in Penal Code, section 209;
The term "carries away" is so ambiguous within the
context of section 209 as to be meaningless;
(3) The misconduct of the prosecutor in his summation was
prejudicial to defendant in the matter of the sentence determined by the jury ;
( 4) The majority has affirmed the infliction of a penalty so
excessive in relation to the defendant's acts as to transgress
the constitutional provision condemning punishments which
are cruel or unusual. (CaL Const., art. I, § 6.)
The jury found the defendant had done these acts:
(1) He sei11ed M. M. and tied her hands behind her with
wire. He held a knife in her back while she searched for her
billfold. Then he ordered her to crawl through her house to
the bedroom. 'rhere he robbed her of $17 or $18, raped her,
and forced her to an act of fellation. He forced her to move
altogether about 75 feet under duress.
(2) He seized L. S. and bound her hands with wire. He
dragged her by the hair 3 or 4 feet into a bedroom, then threw
her 2 or 3 feet onto the bed. He raped her, forced her to an
act of fellation and cut her with his knife. He then dragged
her into a second bedroom an unstated distance away and
locked her in a closet. He stole $200 in cash and a $4,000
money order.
(3) He seized C. F. in her bedroom and bound her hands
with wire. He asked her for her money.· She said she had
$10 in the kitchen but he did not look for it. He did not
take the $1.00 he found in her billfold. Then, to quote the
victim, ''. . . he helped me up on the bed.'' The distance >vas
4 or 5 feet. He then raped her and forced her into perversion.
( 4) He seized L. B. in her bedroom and bound her hands
with wire. He took valuable jewelry and $30 to $40 in cash.
He forced her to walk back about 12 feet to a daybed, and,
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of discomfort. he told her to
up and
her
or feet to a ehair. Then he raped her.
liP seized and bonnd the hands of F. II. in her living
He sai<l he was going to rob her and she
"'Here
I
go ahead and take it.' " She wore
ano her purse was on a sofa in the same room. But
He
her !o the floor 5 feet away in
renter of tlw room and foreed her into
these acts defendant was eonvieted on three eounts of
degTee robbery (Pen.
§ 211a), four counts of rape
261, subd. 3), fonr counts of sex pc•rversion (Pen.
, and five eonnts of kidnaping- with intent to
rob and causing bodily harm (Pen. Codr, § 209).* 'l'he penalty
first degree robbery is not less than five years in the state
; for rape it is not less than three years in the state
; for perversion it is not more than 15 years in state
or not more thau one year in the county jaiL The
was for the term presc·ribrd by law, the terms to run
The penalty for kidnaping with intent to rob
where hodily harm is done to the victim is life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole or deaih. The ehoice is diswith the jury. The jury decided that Wein
should die.
The jury also found that defendant did these acts:
( 6) He seized and bound K. S., aged J 5, shoved her 2 feet
nto a bedroom, raped her and violated Penal Code, section
288a. Afterwards she walked 8 feet at his eomrnand.
) He seized and severdy beat A. C. He moved her 13 feet
into a closet and fled.
( 8) He and an accomplice seized A. H. and "dragged her
';\ny person 'vho seizes, confines, inveigles~ entices, decoys, abducts,
kidnaps} or rarries away any individunl hy any Ineans whatso~
ever
intent to hold or drtain or who holds or detainR, such individual
for ransom, rrward or to commit P:-dortion or to exact from relatives or
friends of such person any money or valuahle thing, or nny person who
or cnrrics nway any individual to connnit rohhcry, or any person
who
or nhets an.'' Sllrh aet, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof shall su ffor c1cnth or sk1ll lw punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for life without
of pnrok. at the discretion of the
trying the same, in cases in
the person or
subjected to
kidnaping suffers or suft'n
l"um or
punished by im,
prisonnwnt in the state prison for
with
of parole in cases
wl1ere such r>crson or
do not suffer
harm.
"
n seni<'nce of imprisonment for life ·without
a convidion mHler this section as it read
prior to
this aet Rhall be eligible for a release on
as if he had been R0ntcmcecl to imprisonment for life with possiof parole.'' (Pen. Code, 9 209.)
'JH
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out onto the floor," a distance of about 3 feet. Defendant
raped her and committed the perverse act.
Por these acts defendant was convicted on two counts of
rape, two counts of sex perversion, and two counts of kidnapas defined by Penal Code, section 207.*
Assuming the
was correct in its factual finding;;;, the
defendant is guilty of the most perverse and outrageous crimes
and should be punished
and with little mercy.
However, it is my condusion that the defendant did not
violate Penal Code, sections 209 or 207, and, assuming
arguendo that he did, the penalty of death is excessive to the
point of barbarity.
No VIOLATION OF PENAL ConE SECTIONS 209 OR 207
Since 1901 there haYe been two kinds of kidnaping in California. Section 207 was enacted in 1872 and codified the commonlaw definition. 'rhe flection originally required that the victim
be carried across a county or state line to constitute kidnaping. In 1905 the Legislature inserted the words '' ... or
into another part of the same county ... '' making it possible to
kidnap a victim without crossing a county line. (Stats. 1905,
chap. 493, p. 653.)
'fhe Legislature enacted section 209 in 1901. It then provided: "Every person who maliciously, forcibly, or fraudulently takes or entices away any person with intent to restrain
such person and thereby to commit extortion or robbery, or
exact from the relatives or friends of such person any money
or valuable thing, is guilty of a felony, and shall be punished
therefor by imprisonment in the state's prison for life, or any
number of years not less than ten."
There was no usc of the word "kidnaping" in the enacting
legislation (Stats. 1901, chap. 83, p. 98, § 1). This section
THERE vVAs

*"Every person who forcibly steals, takes, or arrests any person in
this state, and carries him into another country, state, or county, or into
another part of the same county, or who forcibly takes or arrests any
person, with a design to take him out of this state, without having established a claim, according to the laws of the United States, or of this etate,
or who hires, persuades, entices, decoys, or seduces by false promises,
misrepresentations, or the like, any person to go out of this state, or to be
taken or removed therefrom for the purpose and with the intent to sell
such person into slavery or involuntary servitude, or otherwise to employ
!lim for his own use, or to tho use of another, without the free-will and
consent of such persuaded person; and every person who, being out of
this state, abducts or takes by force or fraud any person contrary to
the law of the place where such act is committed, and brings, sends, or
conveys such person within the limits of this state, and is afterwards
found within the limits thereof, is guilty of kidnaping." (Pen. Code,
~ 207.)
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was not meant to redefine kidnaping. The word first appears
in Deering's Penal Code, 1906 edition, in the heading of the
section. The Legislature first referred to violations of section
209 as kidnaping in 1933 in the descriptive heading to an
amendment to that section (Stats. 1933, chap. 685, p. 1757).
These headings are not enacted into law. That amendment
read: ''Every person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices,
decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold or detain,
or who holds or detains, such individual for ransom, reward
or to commit extortion or robbery or to exact from relatives
or friends of such person any money or valuable thing, or
who aids or abets any such act, is guilty of a felony and upon
conviction thereof shall be punished by life imprisonment
without possibility of parole in cases in which the person or
persons subjected to such kidnaping suffers or suffer bodily
harm inflicted by such kidnapers; or by life imprisonment
with possibility of parole in cases where there is no violence
and upon the recommendation of the trial jury or in the discretion of the trial judge.''
'l'he verb "kidnaps" was included in the definition of the
crime defined by section 209. It cannot be assumed the Legislature meant to define the section 209 crime by itself by
using this word. The word must be construed to have a
meaning apart from and narrower than the erime defined by
section 209. There are two possibilities: (1) It meant common law kidnaping; or (2) it meant kidnaping as defined in
section 207. Since the Legislature had already rejected the
common-law definition of kidnaping and redefined it, the
clear implication is that the word "kidnaps" in section 209
means kidnaping as defined in section 207. This is the contention of the attorney general in his brief in this case.
Section 209 was interpreted from 1933 to 1951 to eneompass
the act of robbery (for example, People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d
175 [217 P.2d 1]; People v. Brown, 29 Cal.2d 555 [176 P.2d
929]). This permitted prosecutors to demand the death
sentence sucressfully for second degree robbery in cases where
accompanying crimes outraged the jury. In 1951, the Legislature amended section 209 to its present form. (Stats. 1951,
chap. 1749, p. 4167.)
(See Pen. Code, § 209, quoted on
page 345 of this opinion.) The 1951 amendment declared that
section 209 was violated to commit robbery only where the
perpetrator "kidnaps or carries away" his victim. These
facts point to the conclusion that defendant in this case is
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not
either
a victim as defined by section 207 or '' earricd her away.''
under section 207. Before 1905 Penal Code,
section 207, required the victim to be carried outside the
before there was a kidnaping. In Ex parte ]{eil, 85
Cal. 309 [24 P. 742), defendants forcPd two victims from their
boat in San Pedro harbor and took them under duress to
Santa Catalina Island. Defendants were held not
of
kidnaping because both the island and San Pedro arc in Los
Angeles
According to the code commissioner's notes
cited in \Vest's A.nnotated Penal Code, sections 1-260, page
622, the 1905 amendment was advisable because of the Kcil
decision. No other reason is advanced for the amendment
than to remove the Keil aberration. This history of section
207 implies that the r~egislature was still contemplating kidnaping in terms of movements over considerable distances.
_.]le words themselves clearly imply this. If the amendment
were intended to include movements of three feet the Legislature would have amended the section by using words designating such minute movements. This is what it did in 1933
when it added such words as ''seize'' and ''confine'' to section
209. Significantly, it did not alter the section 207 definition
of kidnaping at the 1938 session. It meant only to make more
inclusive the false imprisonment of persons for extortion, ransom, and robbery, and therefore amended section 209 only.
It is also significant that when the Legislature amended section
207 in 1905 it did not alter or abolish section 286 which
defines the crime of false imprisonment as "the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another." It appears that
section 236 was aimed to punish violations of liberty not gross
enough to be described as a carrying into another part of the
same county.
Almost all of the California cases which review convictions
under section 207 concerned asportations over considerable
distances, usually many miles. All of them involved greater
distanees than arc represented by the kidnaping of which
\Vein was convicted. None of them involved asportations
entirely within one enclosed plaee. In all of them the asportation was from a plaee where the intended aneillary crime was
difficult of consummation to a place where it was more easily
done. 'l'his was not so in \Vein.
Three cases affirmed convictions under section 207 in which
the asportation was not great. In none of them was the issue
of distance discussed by the court. All of them were decided
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v.
, which
associated the term '
·with the short-haul abduction in that ease. Tanner was convicted undrr section 209.
In
v. lhtntcr, 49 Cal.App.2d 243 [121 P.2d 529]
, defendant
one victim 60
and another
a railroad track to a
of ties to rape them. In
v. Cook, 18 CaLApp.2d 625 [64 P.2d
(1937),
defendant grabbed his victim as she walked in front of his
house and dragged her inside to rape her. In People v.
133 Cal.App.2d 4
P.2d
, defendants
fm·eed their victim into tbeir c-ar and drove him about one and
one-balf blocks to rob him. The court relied on People v.
38 Cal.2d 166 [238 P.2d 1001], for this holding.
A consideration of People v. Tanner, supra, 3 Cal.2d 279,
and People v. Knowles, supra, 35 Cal.2d 175, is important
at this point. Both were decided on the basis of the 1933
amendment to section 209. In
defendants seized
several members of a household and forced them to move about
the house for some hours. In
defendants foreed two
store clerks to walk to a storeroom and one of them to return
to the front of the store, then return to the rear. An examination of the language in these eases reveals that neither Mr.
Justice Seawell in Tanner nor Mr. Justice Traynor in
Knowles relied on the terms "kidnaps or carries away" to
deseribe defendants' acts. In Tanner Mr. Justice Seawell
makes it clear that section 209 is not the same crime as kidnaping in section 207. At page 293 he says, r('garding the
1901 act: "It will be noted that the forcible taking of any person with intent to eommit extortion or robbery, the exact
offense of which the defendants were convicted, is made a
felony. The only change made by the amendments of 1933
[adding inter alia "kidnaps or earries away"] so far as they
affect the instant case was to increaqe the penalty if the pet'son
forcibly tak('n suffers bodily harm.'' (Emphasis added_) This
means that defendants could have been convicted under the
1901 act before the words "kidnaps or carries away" were
added.
Defendants in Tanner attacked the great departure section
209 made from the common-law definition of kidnaping. At
page 296 1\fr. Justice Seawell says: "No reason had been
given why it is not within the purview of the sovereign power
of the state to pronounce or classify as an act of kidnaping
(following closely the language of the statute), the act of
50 C.2d-14
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seizing and confining a person by any means whatever . ... "
(Emphasis that of the court.) The Tanner case therefore
does not bear on the meaning of kidnaping as defined by section 207.
The Knowles decision is even clearer in its reliance on terms
other than "kidnaps or carries away." Mr. Justice Traynor
cites Tanner at page 184: "On appeal from their conviction
under section 209, they [Tanner et al.J contended that their
offense was only armed robbery and that the Legislature did
not intend to punish it under a kidnapping statute. The
court affirmed the conviction, holding that the Legislature is
empowered to define criminal offenses as it sees fit and that
the statute clearly indicates an intention to punish standstill
kidnapping under its provisions. It is suggested that under
the statute there must be movement of the victim, under a
preconceived plan for protracted detention to obtain property
that would not be available in the course of ordinary armed
robbery. Defendant seeks to read into the statute a condition
that the victim be moved a substantial distance. The statute
itself is a refutation of that contention. Movement of the
victim is only one of several methods by which the statutory
offense may be committed. The statute provides that 'Every
person who seizes, confines ... or who holds or detains [any]
individual ... to commit extortion or robbery ... is guilty of
a felony.' " (Emphasis added.)
These cases left the terms "kidnaps" and "carries away"
nnconstrued within the context of section 209. In determining the movement necessary to constitute a violation of section
209, all cases relied on Tanner or Knowles.
After the 1951 amendment here under consideration, this
court held in People v. Chessman, 38 CaL2d 166 (see p. 192)
[238 P.2d 1001] that defendant's act of transporting a victim
22 feet was within the compass of "kidnaping or carrying
away" in section 209. The majority did not analyze the meaning of the terms in that opinion but rather relied on these
authorities:
( 1) People v. Ra1who, 8 Cal.App.2d 655 [ 47 P.2d 1108].
This case was decided in 1935 under the broad 1933 amendment to section 209 and the court cited Tanner as its authority
that there is no distance requirement under section 209.
(2) People v. Cook, 18 Cal.App.2d 625 [64 P.2d 449],
decided in 1937, raised no issue of distance.
(3) People v. Melendrez, 25 Cal.App.2d 490 [77 P.2d 870J,
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within the confines of section 209 before
v.
70 Cal.App.2d 628 [161 P.2d 475],
dec:idrd in 1945, involved a defendant who carrird a child an
unstated distance to the roof of an apartment from a point
the neighborhood. The issue of distance was not raised.
v.
81 Cal.App.2d 709 [184 P.2d 953]
) , in which defendants forced a woman into their car,
her from Compton to 'l'orrance, and forced her into a
house.
(6) Cox v. State, 203 Ind. 544 [177 N.E. 898, 181 N.E.
determined an asportation of 90 feet was sufficient under
statute not similar to Penal Code, seetion 207. Asportation
" '
any place within this state' " was made punishable
( § 2426, Burns 1929 Supp.). Thic; patently refers to shorter
distances than the terms "into another part of the same
county" in section 207. The Indiana statute relates the
taking to the plaee where the taking· begins; section 207 refers
the place where it ends.
(7) State v. Taylor, 70 N.D. 201 [293 N.W. 219], held a
short-hanl asportation to be within a kidnaping- statnte substantially similar to section 209, in that it employs the words
"seized, confines, inveigles, or kidnaps" to describe the crime.
The term ''kidnap" is not elsewhere deseribed in North Dakota statutes. This case cites People v. Melendrez, supra, 25
Cal.App.2d 490, as authority for its own holding.
Therefore only two of these cases, Cook and possibly Shields,
furnish authority for the proposition that short-haul asportation satisfies section 207. And the issue of whether or not
the asportations were sufficient under the section was never
before the courts.
It is therefore my opinion that this court should reexamine
its construction of the word "kidnaps" as used in section
209 and define it as it was meant to be defined by section 207.
Another consideration ignored by the majority is this: The
patent intent of the Legislature in amending seetion 209 in
1951 was to remove simple robbt~ry from the bounds of section
209. Previously, simple robbery invariably constituted shorthaul kidnapiug (see "Robbery Becomes Kidnaping," 3 Stanford L. Rev. 156, a note on People v. Knowles, supra, 35 Cal.
2d 175). 'l'his legislative intent was followed by Mr. Justice
Vallee in reversing a eonYietion in People v. Taylor, 135 Cal.
App.2d 201 [286 P.2d 952]. The case which stimulated the
r~egislature to action was People V. Knowles, supra, 35 Cal.2d
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175. It is
to note that victims were forced to move
in that case and this constituted short-haul kidnaping. In
v.
38 Cal.2d 166
p. 192) [238 P.2d
1001], this court held the Knowles problem was not solved
the 1951 amendment. As a result of Chessman and the
instant
while
is not per se a violation of
section
if the robber mows his victim one inch he is
subject to the death
This
br describrd
as giving force to the
act.
Lastly, if it is possible without doing violence to its words,
a statute is to be construed to have a con,titutional application. The majority have construed it to provide the death
penalty for de minimis. This is within the eompass of cruel
and unusual punishment and such a construction should be
avoided. Section 4 of the Penal Code directs the courts to
construe its provisions according to the fair import of their
terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.
I conclude that defendant has not been guilty of kidnaping
within the purview of either section 207 or section 209 and
the convictions and judgments thereof must be reversed and
the counts of the information alleging them stricken.
THE PHRASE "CARRIEs

AwAY" Is AMBIGuous

Even if defendant <lid not "kidnap" his victims, he would
still be guilty of violating section 209 if he "carried away"
any one of them. We must therefore scrutinize the phrase
"carries away" in section 209.
If we were to say that to "carry away" meant no more
than to cause a victim to move one foot we should necessarily
include the more rigidly defined term ''kidnap,'' since any
act constituting "kidnaping" would also constitute "carrying away." This would make "kidnaps" redundant in section
209. "To carry away" must therefore differ from "to kidnap'' in some way other than in the distance required to consummate the crime. But the statutes and cases of California
establish no clue as to the acts which deserve this label. The
brief of the attorney general does not attempt to assist us.
Penal Code, section 7, subdivision 16, states: "\Vords and
phrases must be construed according to the context and the
approved usage of the language; but technical words and
phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar
and appropriate meaning in law, must be construed according
to such peculiar and apprOJ1riate meaning. . . . "
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines "carry away"
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\V ebst~r: "1. On
way; onward;
2. From a
; hener; then(·e ;---of
motion: as, go away; . . . 4. a Frot'l eontaet or elos~ a;-;soeiation; aside; off ... 5. From one's
;-with a s~nse of
or loss; as, to
one's heart away . ... "
J\Ieaning 2. of away, "F'rom a pla(·e" ma~· be relevant.
the term "place" is une1ear sinee it may be used in
such context>: as '' 'l'o move away from the
'' or ''to
move away from home.'' Its meaning as to distanre is encontextual. To
it a meaning outside a contoxt, as
Legislature has attempted to do, is meaninglrss. "Away"
us to answer the quory "front whaU"
Blackstone says that lan•eny roquired a ''carrying away.''
Blackstone, p. 2440.) rrhis element was satisfied by
the slightest movement of the item to be taken. 'I'he essence
of this common law crime was disturbance of possession and
the movement of the property had to be accompanied by an
intent to terminate the possession permanently. To rip a
from a finely woven context would make a crude patchwork of the statute. The disturbance of possession of personalty bears little resemblance to the depriYation of human
freedom. 'l'hcy are different :social menaces and terms used
to describe them necessarily tind thrmselves in dissimilar
contexts playing semantical trieks on the unwary. I condude
that the technical meaning of "earric'S away" is relevant only
to the context of personal property law and has uo commonly
recognized tedmical application to the realm of crimes against

The vernacular usage of the term may provide help. Suppose one says, "X carried Y away." What image arises in
the mind of the hearer: Certainly not a picture of X foreing
Y to move about a few feet in his own home. Or suppose
one wished to deseribe X's foreing Y to move from one room
to another. Many descriptive words and phrases come to mind
before ''X carried Y away.'' For example, ''X forced Y to
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move against his wilL" The word "away" just does not fit
the facts. If the Legislature intended to include all forced
movements within its definition of section 209 kidnaping for
robbery, a simpler and clearer term would have been used.
'rhis is particularly true in view of the consternation raised
by the decision in People v. Knowles, supra. The allusion to
the command of Penal
section 4, is also
here.
It is apparent that the 1951 amendment was enacted to
assuage the mischief of the Knowles holding. In this context,
this intent should not be construed into oblivion. And it
certainly does not promote justice to hold that the movement
of a person four feet is an offense sufficient to warrant the
death penalty when the statute is open to another less strict
interpretation.
I conclude that the phrase "carries away," as used in section 209, is undefined and meaningless; and that to hold that
it encompasses defendant's acts is to misconstrue it violently.
THE PREJUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OF THE DEPU'£Y
DISTRICT ATTORNEY

While the weight of the evidence is so massive against the
defendant that I cannot say the prejudicial misconduct of the
deputy district attorney was instrumental in the jury's finding defendant guilty, I am of the opinion that this misconduct
was probably a major influence in the jury's decision to fix
the penalty at death. In other words, this misconduct prejudiced defendant's chances to receive a life sentence rather
than death:
(1) He identified defendant with Caryl Chessman and reminded the jury repeatedly that unless defendant were executed he might be released to commit other sex crimes. He
stated that Chessman had been paroled before committing the
more publicized crimes of which he was accused. 'l'his must
have carried considerable weight in the jury's consideration
of the penalty. Yet, defendant and not Chessman was on
trial, and defendant was entitled to have his case determined
on the record of his own trial.
(2) The inflammatory ephithets used to describe defendant
mnst have had an emotional effect on the minds of the jurors.
Powerful words, portraying the images and associations they
conjure, participate actively in forming human judgments.
In a trial as emotionally conceived as this one was, they are
particularly decisive. No objection or admonition could cure
this psychological onslaught: Once spoken, the emotional impact of the words was locked in the minds of its hearers. The
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cited
the majority to justify requiring an objection,
involve the failure to object to evidence. An admonition to
certain testimony in reaching a factual conclusion in a
manner may be effective. But it is far harder to blot
an emotion or a vivid image from the mind of a juror.
this case I do not think it would have been possible.
has been truly said: "You can't unring a bell."
PENAIJTIES INFLICTED IN

Turs

CAsE CoNSTITUTE PuNISH-

MENTS WHICH ARE CRUEL OR UNUSUAL

Consider the
acts for which this court is affirming
death penalty. Defendant seized and bound the hands of
li"'. She told him where her money was but he took none.
He helped her onto a b0d 4 or 5 fc0t away and forced
her to perform sex acts. He was clearly guilty of rape and
perversion. The penalty for rape is not less than three years
in the state prison. For perven:ion it is not more than 15
years in the state prison or less than one year in the county
These were brutal and revolting acts. But for moving
F. 4 or 5 feet, "helping" her to the bed, he is to be
executed. But for this movement he would not lwve received
the death penalty! The case involving U. H. is similar except
that he did not rape her. Defendant committed the same
atrocities on A. H. as he did on C. F. and in fact did more
harm to her than to U. H. But in attacking A. H. he merely
threw her to the floor and raped her and committed perversion. But his penalty for this was not death, but two prison
terms! Why? Because he did not move her the necessary
one 1:nch nor incidentally ask for her money! Of the condemned movements one must ask: What difference did they
make? The answer: None.
The above comparisons reflect the absurd position into
which this court has backed by following the Tanner, Knowles
and Chessman cases to the consistent but irrational ultimate.
Holmes' epigrammatic "A page of history is worth a volume
of logic" has found its supreme justification.
In each of the other three situations involving the death
penalty, if the victim had not been moved a few feet there
would be no death penalty possible. Under the rule of this
ease a robber wl10 shows his victim against a wall is eligible
for the gas chamber if a prosecutor arbitrarily chooses to ask
for that penalty. Essentially section 209 may be used by a
zralous prosecutor to kill one who has committed other more
soeially condemned crimes which carry less severe penalties.

424

PEOPI,E

v.

\VEIN

[50 C.2d

The instant case is the
The deputy district attorney prosecuting \Vein did tl1is
In his summation he
demanded the death penalty not for defendant's moving his
victims but for the sexual assaults he made upon them. He
cited the
law which inflicts the death penalty for
:rape. He belabored the leeherous acts allegedly done to
L.
then said: "If this is not treatment which earns this
defemhmt the extreme
of
I never ;;aw any.
There is not a :red blooded man on this jury, there isn't a
woman on this jury who in my opinion would say
otherwise.'' His only reference to the movement of L. S.
was: ''He moves her; that is kidnapping for the purpose
of robbery, as I explained it to you here .... " He also said:
"I have only one regret in arguing this ease to you, and that
is that under the law of this state, for the reason that the
defendant did not announce as his purpose robbery at any
time to K. S., that I cannot charge him with kidnapping for
the purpose of robbery with bodily harm and ask you to
return a sixth verdiet of death.''
I conclude that the defendant is in effect, being condemned
to death for de minimis acts. Were the case before me, I
should also say imprisonment for life or a long term of years
would also fall within the seope of cruel or unusual punishment.
This court properly refuses to "draw lines" delineating
what distanee is sufficient to constitute kidnaping. It is the
task of the Legislature. The Legislature attempted by its
1951 amendment to do this and failed to communicate its
intent to this court. 'rhe court has chosen to label all shorthaul asportations "kidnaping." The holding in this ease
that an asportation of four feet is sufficient to send a man to
the gas ehamber illustrates in unshaded tones that all shorthaul asportations must be declared without sections 207 and
209 or not punished by the courts.
This does not mean that no violation of section 207 or
section 209 should be punished in the degree determined by
the Legislature. It means that the penalties assessed in this
pa1·ticular case are too severe beeause the statute, as construed by the majority, iR overly broad. \<Vhile preeise lines
must be drawn by the Legislature, the penalties assessed for
the alleged offrnses in this case are blatantly on the forbidden
side of it. 'l'he judiciary may not abdicate its responsibility to
eondemn a violation of eonstitutional powers with a questionbegging eliche about separation of powers.
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Court in
eems
S.Ct. 544,
hEd.
, faced this problem squarely:
"\Vc disclaim the right to assert a judgment against that
the Legislature of the
of the law~ or the right
oppose the
power to the
power to define
and fix their punishment, unless that power encounters
exercise a constitutional
In such case not
discretion but our legal duty, strietly defined and irnperain its dircetion, is involvccL 'l'hen the
power
brought to the judgment of a power supc•rior to it for the
instant . . . . They have no limitation, we repeat, but constiintioiml ones, and ·what those are tlw jmlieiary must .indge.''
.Mr. Chief Justice ·warren deseribed clearly the problem of
definition: "This Court has had little occasion to give precise
content to the Eighth Amendment, ancl in an enlightened
democracy such as ours, this is not surprising.'' (Trap v.
Dulles, 26 Law Week 4219 at 4223.)
The eases faeing this problem of definition may be divided
into four groups:
(1) Those in whieh the penalty was found not exeessive in
relation to the offense;
(2) 'l'hose in whieh the court held the Lrg·islature free to
prescribe Pven outrageous penalties;
'fhosc holding the phrase ''cruel and unusual punishment' refers only to uneivilized forms of puuislnuent sn<Ch
as quartering;
'I'hose holding punishment dearly disproportionate to
the offense to be unc-onstitutionally cruel, unusual, or both.
The problem in California is simpler than that faced by
the federal courts, since our guarantee is stated disjunctively:
''Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exeessive fines imposed; nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted."
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 6.)
I believe the most persuasive authority supports my judgnwnt that clearly exee»sive punishnwnts arc unconstitutionaL
The defendant in Weems v. Fnitecl States, S1tpra, 217 U.S.
349, reeeived a statutorily mandatory sentence of 12 years at
hard labor in irons plus the permanent loss of many civil
rights for falsifying two entries in an offieial cash book. Mr.
Justice McKenna says of this sentence at page 377:
"It is cruel in its cxeess of imprisonment and that which
accompanirs and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in its
character. Its punishments come under the condemnation
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of the bills of
account of their degree and
kind."
Chief Justice ·warren continued in Trop v. Dulles, supra, 26
Law \Veek 4219 at 4223, concerning the Vveems decision:
"The Court recognized in that case that the words of the
Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not
static. The amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."
In O'Neil v Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 [12 S.Ct. 693, 36 L.Ed.
450], the court held the Eighth Amendment does not inhibit
state action. The defendant was sentenced to 54 years in
prison for sales of liquor during a single day. Justices Field,
Harlan and Brewer dissented on the ground that the Fourteenth Amendment gave the Eighth Amendment protection
against the states. They agreed that the inhumane sentence
in this case contravened the Eighth Amendment.
Two compelling reasons for condemning excessive sentences
are stated in Cox v. State, 203 Ind. 544 [177 N.E. 898, 181
N.E. 469, at 471]. The court quotes United States v. Barromeo, 23 Philippine 279 at 289:
"A contrary view leads to the astounding result that it is
impossible to impose a cruel and unusual punishment so long
as none of the old and discarded modes of punishment are
used; and that there is no restriction upon the power of the
legislative department, for example, to prescribe the death
penalty by hanging for a misdemeanor, and that the courts
would be compelled to impose the penalty. Yet such a punishment for such a crime would be considered extremely cruel and
unusual by all right-minded people."
At page 472 the Indiana court in Co.:c v. State, 203 Ind.
544 [177 N.E. 898, 181 N.E. 469], suggests that the reason
the issue of a punishment's cruelty and unusualness is not
often before the appellate courts is that juries are so constituted as to find persons innocent when the punishment for
an alleged offense offends their sense of justice. Obviously
this element could not sway the jury so to favor a defendant
whose sex crimes cried for vengeance.
The finest exposition of the doctrine of unconstitutional
excessiveness is State v. Ross, 55 Ore. 450 [104 P. 596, 42
L.R.A.N.S. 601]. Defendant was sentenced to five years in
the state prison and fined $576,853.74 for embezzling $288,426.87 in state funds. He was to be imprisoned in the county
jail until the fine was paid, but not longer than 288,426 days

1958]

PEOPLE
[50 C.2d 383:

v. WEIN
3~6

427

P.2d 457]

790 years. The court revrrsed the sentence
imprisonment for nonpayment of the fine on the ground
it was cruel and unusual punishment.
There is language in California eases upholding
. Ea:
J(ar1so11, JGO Cal. 378, at 88:3 [117 P.
, said the danger that persons
for
c-ontempt were prot<,cted against exeessivc restraint
the
,•onstitutional rule
enwl or unusual
In In re Finley, 1 CaLApp. 198 [81 P.
, the court reargument;;; that excessive sentences were not unconstibut held thr death penalty for an assault by a life
eonYict was justified. 'rhc eourt said at pages 201-202:
i i It i;;; only when the punishment is OUt of all T\Y'C>nfYP'tl
offense, and is beyond question an
crime of onrinary amvit y cornmdt ed under ordinary cirthat courts may denounce it as unusual."
Contra this position is In re O'Shea, 11 CaLApp. 5G8 [105
77G], which contains a dictum, at page
that only
punishments of a barbarous clmraetcr, like quartering, are
(Tuel and unusual. (The court used the c-onjunctive.)
'rhere is language in People v. Tatmer, supra, 3 Ca1.2d 279,
298, which may he read to mean that the death penalty for
hidnaping is not 0xcessive. But it is insufficient to paste a
label to an act and justify enormities by it. This illustrates
the profundity of the insight: "\Vhat's in a name?'' It is
tantamount to playing categories with human life. Moving
person four feet does not justify taking life no matter what
v1·ord,; describe the act.
Other cases vvhieh uphold the proposition that excessiveness
is fatal to a sentence are: Application of Cannon, 203 Ore.
629 [281 P.2d 233] (life imprisonment for assault to commit
rape held cruel and unusual) ; State v. Devore, 225 Iowa 815
[281 N.W. 740, 118 A.I1.R 1104] (impri~onment until fine
paid held cruel and unusual); Wi7liams v. State, 125 Ark. 269
fl88 S.\V. 826] (sentence to solitary eonfinPmrnt for a misdemranor held cruel and unusual) ; Slate v. 1Fhitaker·, 48 I.1a.
Ann. 527 [19 So. 457, 35 L.RA. 5Gl] (sentence of six years
for destroying plants held cruel and unusual) ; State v.
.C.) (imprisonment in
78 Kenan's N.C. Hepts. 3GG
eonnty jail for five years and reeogni~ance of $500 to keep
the peaee for fiye ~-pars thcre::J ftcr for assault and battery
held cruel and unusual); Sinclair· v. State, 161 Miss. 142 [132
So. !581 at 582, 74 A.L.R 241]
jnstires' conenrring opinion said sentcneing an insane person to life imprisonment is
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cruel and unusual); Sterle
140 Minn. 112 [167 N.\V.
345, 347, 1 A.T-i.R. 331] (a
term
excessive
would be cruel and unusual); McDonald v. Commonwealth,
173 Mass. 322 [53 N.E.
73 Am.St.Rcp.
(imprisonment may be so long as to be cruel and unusual).
I conelude that the death
inf1icted on this defendant for moving five victims from four to 75 feet (:annot stand
in the face of the eonstltntional ma1Hlatc that cruel or mnumal
punishment may not be infiicH:d. The
must therefore be reversed. The acts of moving K. S. 10 feet and A. C.
13 feet are serious enough to warrant punishment. The minimum punishment prescribed for these acts, one year in the
state prison, may not be excessive for them.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 25,
1958. Carter, .T., \vas of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.
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[1] Criminal Law-Instructions-Limitation of Evidence to Particular Purpose.-In the absence of a request the trial court
was not required to instruct the jury that hearsay testimony
given in rebuttal was admissible solely for the purpose of impeaching witnesses appearing for the accused. (Disapproving
People v. G1·imcs~. 148 Cal.App.2d 747, 307 P.2d 932; People v.
Bentley, 131 Cal.App.2d 687, 281 P.2d 1.)
[2] Id.- Appeal- Presumptions-Instructions.-Where some of
the prosecutor's statements might be construed that hearsay
evidence was received not only for purposes of impeachment
but also as proof of the charge against defendant but no
objection was made, a reviewing court must assume that, if
defendant had objected, the trial court would have informed
the jury that the hearsay evidence was to be considered solely
for purposes of impeachment.
See Am.Jur., 'rrial, § 670.
McK. Dig. References:
Criminal Law, § 786; [2] Criminal
Law, § 1295; [3] Poisons,
9.2(3), 15;
Poisons, §§ 9.2(2),
9.2(3).

